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Mary Levy, Washington Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs
Mayoral Control of Public Schools: Lessons from Other Cities
March 19, 2004

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Mayoral Control of Public Schools: Lessons From Other Cities

Mary Levy
Public Education Reform Project,
Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs

March 19,2004 -- DRAFT

Cities usually cited as examples of new mayoral control are Boston (1992), Chicago (1995), Cleveland (1998), Detroit (1999), Philadelphia (2001) and New York (2002). The following is based on reading and study of the literature on mayoral control.

Limits

Lesson 1: We do not yet know much. Other cities' paths to success and failure may not apply in the context of the District of Columbia

  • The history is recent, and limited to a handful of cities.
  • Events, mayors, structures, strategies, constituencies and outcomes vary from one city to the next.

Lesson 2: The "trend" to mayoral control is limited. Most cities still have independent elected school boards with their own taxing authority, but the minority with appointed boards has increased.

  • Of 62 members of the Council of the Great City Schools, 48 have elected boards, 12 have appointed boards and 2 have a mix.
  • Of the 50 elected or part-elected boards, 9 depend for funding on their city or county government.
  • Boston, Cleveland and Detroit changed from elected to appointed boards; Chicago, New York and Philadelphia have had appointed boards for years but have recently given their mayors greater powers. Baltimore, which had strong mayoral control, is losing it to the state.

Lesson 3: Nothing inherent in mayoral control leads necessarily to better schools. Researchers agree that:

  • Governance arrangements are best viewed as enabling
  • The process is not self-executing. The outcomes depend upon multiple choices and factors, not all within governmental control

The Process of Greater Mayoral Control

Lesson 4: The common context in which mayoral control has increased is -

  • Large city schools with heavy minority enrollment, low average achievement, fiscal problems and charges of mismanagement
  • Years of superintendent turnover, policy churn, public discord, and attempted reforms that have not resulted in system-wide improvement, leading to a loss of confidence in boards and superintendents and the urge to "do something."
  • Impetus for change from business, state government, foundations, good government advocates, especially corporate elites, and a desire to try corporate governance structures
  • Racial division and sometimes polarization, with resistance to more mayoral control centered in African-American communities

Lesson 5: Bases for resistance to mayoral control. Many are legitimate and need to be addressed.

  • Fear of loss of jobs from cost-cutting, privatization, or bias, particularly where schools have a history as an important source for minority group employment
  • Perception of assault on schools as an institution that has served as a particular source of leadership and pride in African-American communities
  • Loss of influence and access in a shift from ward-based, school-centered electorates to a city-wide electorate that is larger, less informed and more concerned with competing issues
  • Value placed on electoral process and representation
  • Suspicion of the motives of those advocating mayoral control, especially business, as less concerned with education than with increased financial and political power through control of the schools
  • Fear, often based on experience, that change will not benefit them, and perhaps will not improve schools at all

Lesson 6: Variables in the context. Cities differ in such critical factors as:

  • The prior governance structure as elected vs. appointed vs. state controlled
  • The level of civic capacity and grassroots activism
  • The constituencies supporting or opposing the mayor, their alignments with each other, and their size and influence
  • Competing goals and issues for the mayor and other actors and constituencies
  • Mayor's own style, tactics, choices and interests
  • Role of state government-legislature, governor, department of education

Lesson 7: Mayoral control is variable. Mayors operate directly and through appointed boards, formally and informally, in varying degrees of control, depending on local politics, laws, and the individual mayor. A mayor's style and interests are important.

  • The Mayor appoints the superintendent/CEO in three cities - Chicago, Cleveland and New York. Elsewhere the school board appoints, with varying degrees of mayoral influence.
  • Individual mayors, based on personal drive and electoral pressures, may seek to lead reform, choose and then defer to a superintendent/CEO, use schools for patronage and electoral advantage, or avoid involvement. Some mayors seek greater control while others merely accept it, sometimes reluctantly.
  • Mayors are limited by electoral concerns, competition for their time and attention, veto points all over the political system, resource availability, the political need for quick results, and the general experience that school improvement is difficult and slow.

Outcomes So Far:

Lesson 8 Student achievement. It is difficult to link changes in governance to improvements in student achievement, though modest increases in test scores have occurred in some cities, and the lowest performing schools have generally improved compared to city averages.

  • Boston, Chicago and Cleveland, with the longest history of mayoral control, have improved test scores in both elementary and secondary schools, though their racial achievement gaps remain. All three have had the benefit of considerable and unusual stability in governance and the superintendency.
  • Detroit's scores have gone down.
  • The lowest 20% of schools have improved, and have done so more rapidly than their school systems as a whole.

Lesson 9: Finance and management. It is easier to clean up district-level finances and change management practices than to dent student achievement

  • City schools under mayoral control have balanced budgets, but had the benefit of previously stronger local economies
  • Anecdotal reports indicate improvements to facilities, maintenance, texts and teacher recruitment
  • Higher spending on central administration than other cities

Lesson 10: Educational policy and practice.

  • Mayors tend to concentrate on measurable results, notably standards and test scores.
  • Mayor-controlled systems tend to increase centralization and rely on top-down reform
  • Reforms are likely to include higher and more limited promotion standards, focus on low-performing schools including identification and interventions for failing schools, focus on reading and math, and adoption of standards and common curricula
  • Higher per pupil spending on instruction and teacher salaries than other cities - but apparently carried over from time predating takeover and more student support staff than other cities.

Lesson 11: Leadership, politics, constituencies, community

  • There is no political majority urging a return to school board dominated regimes.
  • No different from other cities in the tenure of the mayor or superintendent, but appointed board members have shorter tenures than elected members do
  • Mayors tend to appoint loyalists to the school board with the understanding that the CEO is the key person for policy and details. The CEO is a high-level patronage job.
  • School boards shift from being forums for public debate, contention, access and constituent services to being more elite, unanimous, and distant.
  • Business interests gain while grassroots lose in influence and access. Outcomes for unions and their members vary.

Factors Favoring Success

Political context: The political stars need to be in alignment for greater mayoral control even to be possible, let alone successful in improving schools:

  • Committed and skilled leadership by a mayor willing and able to spend substantial amounts of time and political capital
  • Willingness on the part of city officials to use scarce resources and preferably a strong local economy
  • A stable coalition of supporters of greater mayoral control, especially those constituencies that elect and may re-elect the mayor and that are most influential in the practice of governing the city
  • Cooperation between the mayor and the existing school administration
  • Local trust in the mayor's leadership and abilities to improve schools
  • A grassroots foundation for reform

Policy context and actions:

  • Clear and attainable goals
  • Appropriate and effective educational policies
  • Implementation of policies and plans, and a cadre of competent, committed professionals to
  • Accountability of those in control
  • Stability of leaders, staff and plans 

References:

Michael W. Kirst. "Mayoral Influence, New Regimes, and Public School Governance, CPRE Research Report Series RR049, May 2002, Consortium for Policy Research in Education. www.ecs.org

Kenneth K. Wong & Francis X. Shen. "Do School District Takeovers Work? Assessing the Effectiveness of City and State Takeovers as a School Reform Strategy," The State Education Standard, Spring 2002 (National Association of State Boards of Education), pp. 19-23.  www.ecs.org

Debra Viadero. "Big-City Mayors' Control of Schools Yields Mixed Results," Education Week, Sept. 11, 2002. www.edweek.com

Kenneth K. Wong & Francis X. Shen, "When Mayors Lead Urban Schools," Paper prepared for School Board Politics Conference, Program on Education Policy and Governance, Harvard University, Oct. 2003. www.ecs.org

Jeffrey R. Henig & Wilbur C. Rich, eds. Mayors in the Middle: Politics, Race, and Mayoral Control of Urban Schools, Princeton University Press (2004).

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