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Mary Levy
Structural Effects of Mayoral Control and Their Possible Outcomes
March 26, 2004

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Structural Effects of Mayoral Control and Their Possible Outcomes

Structural effect

On the one hand …

On the other hand …

Creates a single point of electoral accountability for public schools

Pressures for improvement can be focused instead of diffused

Mayors have a broad range of electoral issues, diluting the impact of public education issues

Concentrates power in a single point of authority

Superintendent reports to one person, not a group of individuals

Can protect the superintendent and reform plan and strengthen support to implement reforms

Enables greater integration of city services with schools; pooling greater resources and political capital of city

Can protect incompetence, corruption and ineffective fad reforms, with less likelihood of corrective action

Can permit patronage and other decisions based on political advantage rather than educational needs

Broadens the constituency, making a citywide perspective dominant

Helps overcome resistance from established interest groups

Diminishes representation of particular areas of city and accords more influence to people less involved with and knowledgeable of schools

Shifts the locus of power to those with the ear of the mayor

Brings in new supporters with energy, enthusiasm and resources

Improvement often bypasses low-income schools and neighborhoods

Moves decision-makers further from school operations and constituencies

Reduces likelihood of micromanagement

Reduces access for parents, community and others most affected by schools

Decision-makers are likely to have limited knowledge of schools and little time to devote to them

Diminishes number of veto points for change

Enables jump-starting reform over resistance

Fewer checks on incompetence, corruption and ineffective fad reforms

Ties school leadership to mayoral election cycle

Mechanism for accountability

Relatively short time frame invites simplistic solutions that do not work or cause damage

Superintendent likely to change when mayor does

Not long enough to sustain reform

By Mary Levy, Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs
March 26, 2004

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